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Friend of the Court: How the WTO Justifies
the Acceptance of the Amicus Curiae Brief
from Non-Governmental Organizations
Jared B. Cawley*
I.

Introduction

The Friend of the Court Brief1 or the Amicus Curiae Brief has
become a staple in cases appearing before the United States Supreme
Court. 2 In fact, during the 1998-99 term, "ninety-five percent of the
cases argued before the Supreme Court had at least one amicus filing."3
It is no wonder that the Amicus Curiae Brief has found its way into use
* LL.M. in American Indian and Indigenous Peoples, University of Tulsa College
of Law (2004); J.D., University of Tulsa College of Law (2003). The author wishes to
dedicate this article to the following individuals: David & Nancy Cawley, Kimberly &
Lydia Cawley, and Dr. Gordon T. Allred (who made writing "cool").
1.
The function of the amicus curiae at common law was a form of oral
"shepardizing," the bringing up of cases not known to the judge. Inthis role,
the amicus submission originally was intended to provide a court with impartial
legal information that was beyond its notice or expertise, which is where the
name amicus curiae, or "friend of the court" is derived.
Note, Friends of the Court? The Ethics of Amicus Brief Writing in First Amendment
Litigation, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1605, 1607 (1999).
2. Id. at 1611.
3. Id.
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in international law, specifically into the dispute resolution process of the
World Trade Organization (WTO). This acceptance by the Appellate
Body in the WTO has led to controversy and outcry by key members of
the WTO.4
The predecessor to the WTO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, did not allow non-member, and thus, non-governmental groups to
supply unsolicited briefs to the dispute resolution process.5 Similarly,
there is no specific language under the WTO agreement that permits
submission of unsolicited briefs by member or non-member
organizations. Article 13 of Annex 2 of the WTO agreement, entitled
"Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes" (DSU), speaks mainly to each arbitration panel's right to seek
information and advice from anyone, if they so choose.6 The article says
nothing of the acceptance of information and advice from unsolicited
sources.
This article will begin with the discussion of the history and role of
the Amicus Curiae Brief in the U.S. Courts, followed by its use
internationally. Next, it will look briefly at the role of the dispute
resolution panels and Appellate Body of the WTO, and how disputes are
originally brought before each body. Finally, it will look at the
justification offered by the Appellate Body for acceptance of the Amicus
Curiae brief from WTO Member/Governmental Organizations and NonMember/Non-Governmental Organizations,8 specifically the Shrimp
7
Turtle Decision and The British Steel Case.
History of the Amicus Curiae Brief

II.

Amicus curiae is defined as: "A person who is not a party to a
lawsuit but who petitions the court to file a brief in the action because
that person has a strong interest in the subject matter." 9 While scholars
debate the location of the first use of the amicus curiae, it is generally
accepted that the amicus curiae became common practice during the 1 7th

4.

Daniel Pruzin, Key WTO Members Score Appellate Body for Its Decision to

Accept Amicus Briefs, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORTER, June 15, 2001, at 924.
5. Padideh Ala'i, Judicial Lobbying at the WTO: The Debate Over the Use of
Amicus CuriaeBriefs and the U.S. Experience, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 62, 67 (2000).
6. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, [WTO Agreement], Annex 2, art. 13, Legal Instruments-Results of the
Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1234 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
7. U.S. - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT[DS58/AB/R, 1, 12 Oct. 1998 [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle].
8. U.S. - imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/AB/R 1,
10 May 2000 [hereinafter British Steel].
9. Black's Law DictionaryNew Pocket Edition 32 (1996).
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Century in England. 10 Along with the majority of English common law,
which followed the first pilgrims across the Atlantic Ocean, the amicus
curiae found a home in early U.S. courts as well.
A.

Use in US. Courts: From Neutral "Friend"to PoliticalAdvocate

Originally, the amicus curiae, usually a non-party, was a stand-in
for infants and aided the court by pointing out "manifest error... the
death of a party to [a] proceeding, and ... existing applicable statutes.""
This role expanded over time to the point where judges and attorneys
were appointing themselves as amici 12 in cases so that they could advise
their friends or other third parties, who may have been parties or
from being a
attorneys in the case.' 3 Thus, the amicus curiae moved
14
"friend of the court" to an advocate of personal interests.
Despite this move to advocacy, the amicus curiae was rarely used. 15
It was not until after 1820 that it finally found its way into the U.S.
Supreme Court. 16 During the early days of the Supreme Court, the Court
looked unfavorably on intervention by third-parties to suits in which they
had only political and no direct interest. 17 However, the lower state
courts often granted the privilege to file amicus curiae briefs to prevent
be caused by lack of representation" of third
the "injustice which would
18
party interests in a suit.
Eventually, the amicus curiae brief made a rather "dramatic and
unusual"' 9 entrance to the stage of the Supreme Court in Green v.
Biddle. ° In a move which would clearly not be granted today, the great
orator Henry Clay, on behalf of the State of Kentucky (who was not a
party to the suit), appeared as an amicus curiae before the Supreme

10. Note, supra note 1, at 1607.
11. Id.
12. In Ex parteLloyd, the reporter of the case, a practicing attorney, had further
demonstrated his versatility by accepting retainers from both sides, and thus felt
himself in a quandary. The Lord Chancellor, sitting in a bankruptcy case, felt
he had no authority to advise an attorney as to which client to represent; but the
Lord Chancellor was not to be out done in this game of shifting roles. He
promptly appointed himself amicus curiae and in this second capacity did
advise the attorney.
Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J.
694, 695 (1963).
13. Note, supra note 1, at 1607.
14. Id. at 1608.
15. Krislov, supra note 12, at 699.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 697-98.
18. Id. at 699.
19. Id. at 700-01.
20. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1 (1823).
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Court, and sought for and received a rehearing on Green.21 The
acceptance of Henry Clay as amicus is unusual, because an amicus curiae
cannot act on behalf of a party.22 Clearly Clay's request for a rehearing
on Green, so that he could file an amicus brief on behalf of the State of
Kentucky, was an action made on behalf of a party.23
More controversy 24 surrounding the use of the amicus curiae came
to the forefront in Florida v. Georgia.25 In a case between the two states
of Florida and Georgia, the U.S. Attorney General sought permission
from the Supreme Court to enter the fray as an amicus to the interests of
the citizens of the U.S. 2 6 While it was generally permissible for the
attorney general to speak on behalf of the citizens of the U.S., in this case
it was slightly different because, for all intents and purposes, the U.S.
had an arguably, quasi-interest in the outcome of this case.27 In spite of
the controversial nature of the decision to allow the government to
intercede as amicus, this case marked the beginning of a pattern in which
the U.S. government has participated as amicus in cases presented before
the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court.2 8
Eventually, the practice found its way into use by private interest
groups. 29 The ever-expanding acceptance of the amicus curiae brief led
to an overwhelming burden and time constraint placed upon the Supreme
Court. 30 Under the guise of "judicial economy" the Supreme Court
adopted a set of rules and customs necessary for filing a proper amicus
curiae brief to the Court. 3 1 One such early rule only allowed non-parties
to submit an amicus brief to the Court if both parties to the suit agreed to
the submission.3 2 However, the Supreme Court would still, rather

21.

Krislov, supra note 12, at 701.

22. Id.
23. id.
24. While suits between states fall within the original jurisdiction of the Court,
all jurisdictional grants involving the U.S. mentioned in the Constitution are
included within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. By allowing the U.S. to
participate as amicus curiae, the Court was, in effect, evading the jurisdictional
grants of article III which literally applied would have prevented the federal
government's participation as an interested party in suits involving the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction.
Id.
25.

Floridav. Georgia, 58 U.S. 478 (1854).

26. Krislov, supra note 12, at 701.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 702.
29. Comment, The EthicalImplications of Amicus Briefs: A Proposalfor Reforming
Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1219, 1227
(1999).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1227-28.
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frequently,
grant requests that may have not been approved by either
33
party.

Over the years, the filing of the amicus curiae has become less
controversial, and more frequent. The purposes and reasons for such
submissions vary, but not largely so. Often, non-parties (whether they
are governmental, private-interest groups, 34 or private individuals) file
briefs on behalf of constitutional, environmental, and civil rights issues.
In fact, the amicus curiae was the backbone of several notable Supreme
37
36
Court cases, 35 including "Gideon v. Wainwright, Escobedo v. Illinois,39
and Miranda v. Arizona."38 Another such notable case, Mapp v. Ohio,
was filed by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) on behalf of a
defendant who had been arrested for possession of illegal pornographic
books. 40 The U.S. Supreme Court found that the parties to the suit failed
miserably in effectively arguing the unlawful search and seizure issues,
and relied heavily in drafting its decision on the amicus brief filed by the
ACLU.4 1
While helpful to the defendant in Mapp, and in other notable cases,
the amicus curiae has moved from "friend of the court" to "friend of the
party" to "friend of the lobbyist." Becoming directly involved in a suit
as an additional party can be very expensive. However, when the interest
is important to the organization, submitting an amicus brief is a common
means of advancing an organization's own policies in court.42 Private
groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) 43 have thrived as additional advocates by filing amicus curiae,
33. Id. at 1228.
34. Even though such groups possess the same interest as that of a party with
respect to the litigation's out come [sic], the primary function of a group of this
nature is to advise the court and educate it regarding policy implications and
procedural problems from the point of view of the interest group, while, at the
same time, helping the court arrive at a fair decision.
Id. at 1239.
35. Note, supra note 1, at 1608.
36. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
37. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
38. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
39. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
40. Comment, supra note 29, at 1228-29.
41. Id. at 1229.
42. Id. at 1239.
43. Moreover, the identification of the NAACP with such briefs is not merely a
contemporary one, for that organization has, almost from its inception,
participated as amicus curiae in litigation. An early case in point is Guinn v.
U.S., the famous Grandfather Clause case, where the NAACP justified its
participation on the grounds that "the vital importance of these questions to
every citizen of the U.S., whether white or colored, seems amply to warrant the
submission of this brief."
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while other groups, such as the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.
(PLAC), have been created merely for the purpose of filing such briefs. a
Regardless of the initials or the policies of the organization, the amicus
curiae brief has evolved into an effective lobbying tool for privateinterest groups. Additionally, the trend has moved from filings by single
groups to filings by numerous groups on both sides of the issue.
In order to preserve judicial economy, further limits have been
placed on filing amicus curiae. Specifically, in order to file, a group or
groups must limit "the amicus to the [efficient] presentation of
[necessary] material [significantly] relevant ' 4 5 to the issues presented by
the parties to the suit. While other countries may have used amicus
curiae since the early days of ancient Roman law,4 6 the trend in its use in
international courts has tended to limit its use to those rules and practices
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court. 7
B.

Use in InternationalCourts

The common law tradition of the amicus curiae has found general
acceptance in a majority of countries other than the U.S. However,
where the U.S. allows the open lobbying efforts now inherent in the use
of the amicus brief, other countries and international courts have not
been as open to this newfound use. There are exceptions. France, as
well as other civil law countries, believes in the tradition of an open court
system and welcomes intervention by third parties.4 8
The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), the
predecessor to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had seemed to
allow the intervention of third parties into a dispute.4 9 The intervention
enjoyed by nongovernmental groups before the PCIJ, however, was not
to be had before the newly revised and revamped ICJ. 50 In a move fairly
similar to that taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in the early half of the
1900s, the ICJ placed strict guidelines 5' on submissions of material to the
Krislov, supra note 12, at 707.
44. Comment, supra note 29, at 1239.
45. Comments, The Amicus Curiae,55 Nw. U. L. REV. 469,470 (1960).
46. Note, supra note 1, at 1607.
47. Ala'i, supra note 5, at 94.
48. Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in
InternationalProceedings,88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611, 616 (1994).
49. Id. at 620.
50. Id.at 623.
51. The Court has a legitimate institutional concern about opening the
floodgates to participation by every individual and association interested in its
proceedings. Of course, any court accepting amicus participation retains
discretion to deny permission to any or all petitioners. In addition, the Court's
Statute clearly limits participation to international organizations, eliminating
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Court by nongovernmental organizations.52
During an advisory
proceeding in 1950, the International League of Human Rights (ILHR)
sought permission to submit information to the ICJ. 53 In a move clearly
designed to restrict the participation of the ILHR, the Court granted
permission to the group, but limited its information to "legal
questions., 54 The group was also admonished "not to include any
statement of facts that the Court had not been asked to appreciate. 5 5
Unfortunately for the ILHR and for many other nongovernmental
organizations,5 6 the ILHR failed to follow the instructions given by the
ICJ and was subsequently denied participation.57 Because of the ILHR's
failure to follow instructions, other groups
have been denied the
58
opportunity to submit information to the ICJ.
Dinah Shelton, Professor of Law at Santa Clara University School
of Law believes that recent cases, such as that brought by Hungary
against Slovakia, are prime examples of why there is a need to begin
allowing a greater role from non-governmental organizations. 59 The case
involves a large diversion of the flow of the Danube River, and also
includes a heated controversy in environmental and treaty issues.6 °
Professor Shelton argues that neither Hungary nor Slovakia has the
monetary means of effectively researching and presenting the issues in
this case, and that involvement by nongovernmental environmental
organizations, which have better information and experts in this field,
could provide the Court with valuable information in deciding the
equitable outcome of this case. 6' However, as has been shown in cases
like Nicaragua v. United States,62 the ICJ has occasionally adopted
the possibility of submissions from individuals or national groups.
Id. at 624.
52. Id. at 623.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 626.
55. Id.
56. In a letter dated March 28, 1994, the Registrar informed the [International
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War] that the Court had "considered
your offer with all the care it deserves," noting the physicians' close working
relationship with the WHO and their contribution to a relevant publication.
However, having regard to the circumstances of the case and the scope of the
WHO's request, the Court had decided not to ask the organization to submit a
written or oral statement.
Id. at 624.
57. Id. at 623-24.
58. Id. at 625.
59. Id. at 625.
60. Id.
61. Shelton, supra note 48, at 626.
62. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the
Application).
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information by outside resources, but this practice will not be overly used
in "contentious" cases, according to Professor Shelton.63
The role of the amicus curiae in England has stayed relatively true
to its original common usage in the 17 th century, with a few minor
changes. Traditionally, the role is restricted to appointment by the
Attorney General, to prevent injustice, and to provide representation to
absent parties.64 The former British Colony of Hong Kong has adopted a
similar practice. 65
In Europe, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 66 frequently and

generally accepts amicus curiae in its cases.6 7 Additionally, under the
European Union, Union member states "are allowed to intervene in cases
before the Court.",68 However, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) initially did not allow submissions to the court by third parties.69
Considering the fact that the court did not even allow a petitioner to
appear before the Court prior to the 1970s, this restricted role for nonparties seems understandable.7 ° It was not until the 1980s, following
the court amended
Young, James and Webster v. United Kingdom7 1 that
73
its rules 72 to allow for submissions by third parties.

Having witnessed the swing from helpful "friend of the court" to the
extremely burdensome and time-consuming "friend of the lobbyist," it is
unsurprising that important international courts, such as the ICJ and the
ECHR, have been reluctant to loosen the restrictive rules on the use of
amicus curiae by non-parties. Viewing this tradition in these courts, it is
63. Shelton, supra note 48, at 628.
64. Johannes Chan, Focus on the Ma Case: Amicus Curiae and Non-Party
Intervention, 27 HONG KONG L. J. 391, 394-95 (1997).

65. Id.
66. The purpose of the amicus intervention in the European Court of Justice is
to enable a third party to protect an interest that may be affected by the result of
the case. The interest is less than that normally required for intervention as a
party, but it must be direct and specific or concrete. The requirement has been
broadly construed, especially with regard to representative bodies. Thus, the
Italian National Union of Consumers could intervene in competition cases
because of the beneficial effects of competition on consumers.
Shelton, supra note 48, at 629.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 630.
70. Id.
71. Young, James & Webster, 76 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
72. The President may, in the interest of the proper administration of justice,
invite or grant leave to any Contracting State that is not a Party to the
proceedings to submit written comments within a time limit and on issues that
he shall specify. He may also extend such an invitation or grant just leave to
any person concerned other than the applicant.
Id. at 631.
73. Shelton, supra note 48, at 631.
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also unsurprising that many nations other than the U.S. do not desire to
have the amicus brief wander into the halls of the WTO dispute
resolution process. But to more fully understand how the amicus curiae
could possibly aid panel and Appellate Body decisions under the WTO,
we must first understand the basics of this process.
III.
A.

World Trade Organization Dispute Resolution Process
Brief History of the Development of the WTO

In an effort to develop and promote international trade through
regulation, the International Trade Organization (ITO) was proposed
following World War I1.74 However, due to fears in the U.S. Senate that
this agreement would undermine the sovereignty of the U.S., the ITO
agreement never came into fruition.75 A similar organization, with a
similar intent, was found in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).7 6 The general purpose of GATT was to prevent discrimination
in trading between competing, member countries. 77 Dispute Resolution
Panels were created in 1955 under the GATT system to handle disputes
between the contracting member governments; however, the decisions by
these panels were non-binding.78 During the history of the GATT,
claims from non-governmental, and thus non-member organizations were
not a problem. 79 Only one non-governmental organization (NGO) ever
participated in the dispute resolution process, the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC). 80 The belief of the governing members of the
GATT, that member "states will comply only when it is in their self
interest to do so,'81 was a reflection of the non-binding decision making
of the GATT dispute resolution process, which ultimately led to the rule
oriented WTO.82

74. BARRY E.CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 538 (Aspen Law
& Business, 3d ed. 1999).
75. Michael Laidhold, Private Party Access to the WTO: Do Recent Developments
in InternationalTrade Dispute Resolution Really Give Private Organizationsa Voice in

the WTO?, 12 TRANSNAT'L

LAW. 427,429-30

(1999).

76. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 74, at 538.
77. Id.
78. Laidhold, supra note 75, at 430.
79. Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental Interests, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J.

80.
81.
82.

173, 174 (2000).

Id.
Laidhold, supra note 75, at 430-31.
Id.
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The World Trade Organization

During the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations under the GATT
system, several new agreements, as well as several uncovered areas of
trade, were enveloped into the trade institution of the WTO.83 Under the
GATT system, NGOs were required to bring their disputes to their
governmental agencies, which would then contact the offending foreign
government to enter into consultations and negotiations in order to settle
the dispute.84 This negotiation process was completely closed off to
NGOs, despite the fact that they may have been the party most affected
by the outcome.85 After NGOs loudly complained about this problem to
the U.S. government, the U.S. Trade Representative was directed to
ensure that a system was implemented under the WTO that would allow
for the concerns of the NGOs to be heard.86 The result was the formation
of the DSU, 8 7 which outlined the rules and procedures for the settlement
of disputes under the WTO. The dispute resolution process maintained
some of the principles of the GATT; however, a few notable changes
were created to take care of the problems of the GATT.8 8 Specifically,
under the DSU, while the consultation phase and the Dispute Resolution
Panels were maintained, the Appellate Body and an alternative
arbitration system were instituted.89
1.

Consultation Phase

Under the Consultation Phase of the DSU, which is similar to the
same process under GATT, parties are encouraged to meet and negotiate
prior to an appearance before a dispute panel. 90 With the hope that the
consultations will bring a quick end to the dispute, parties are "strongly
encouraged" to "accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate
opportunity for consultation regarding any representations made by
another Contracting Party" within sixty days. 9 1 If the parties are unable
to settle the dispute within the sixty-day period, they are then permitted
to summon a panel.92
CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 74, at 539.
84. Azar M. Khansari, Note, Searching for the Perfect Solution: International
Dispute Resolution and the New World Trade Organization, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV.183, 185 (1996).

83.

85.
86.

Charnovitz, supra note 79, at 177.
Id. at 178.

87.

DSU, supra note 6, at 1226.

88.
89.

Khansari, supra note 84, at 188.
Id. at 191.

90.

Id.

91.
92.

Id. at 191-92.
Id.
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2.

The Dispute Resolution Panels

Under the GATT system of dispute resolution, a panel could only be
summoned by the agreement of all contracting member states. 93 So, if
one of the parties to the dispute wanted to stall the process, it could
simply refuse to allow the dispute to move before a panel.94 Under the
new DSU, however, a principle known as "automaticity" allows the
parties to automatically appear before a panel, even though the
consultation phase is still encouraged. 95
Panels are composed of at least three members who are chosen from
the delegations of WTO member governments.9 6 Under Article 8 of the
DSU, members are to be "well-qualified governmental and/or nongovernmental individuals,, 97 who are instructed to "give their own expert
opinion; they are not allowed to accept instruction from their
governments." 98 The countries of the complaining parties are a further
barrier under Article 8 to a seat on the panel, since panelists are required
to be from a country that is not a party to the complaint "unless the
parties to the dispute agree otherwise." 99 Therefore it would seem
possible, that if each party agrees, each party may have a representative
from their government on the panel. Also, if party members agree to the
names submitted by each country within ten days, the number of
panelists may be composed of five individuals instead of three.'00
Under paragraph six of Article 8, the complaining parties are
provided with the names of the panelists by the office of the Secretariat,
and must accept those chosen unless either party can show "compelling
reasons" for their removal. 10 1 If after twenty days the parties cannot
agree, the Director-General, along with the Chairman of the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) and a chairman of a relevant council or
committee to the dispute, will appoint the members to the panel. 10 2 The
purpose of these panels is to determine the facts relevant to the rules
adopted by the WTO.10 3 This role is accomplished in a manner much

93.

CARTER& TRIMBLE, supra note 74, at 433.

94.

Id.

95. "Automaticity" refers to the ability of the complaining party to have its dispute
moved automatically before a panel, whose decision would become automatically
binding on both parties, and who will then have the automatic right to retaliate against the
offending party should that party decide not to comply with the panel's decision. Id.
96. Khansari, supra note 84, at 192.
97. DSU, supra note 6, at 1231.
98. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 74, at 435.
99. DSU, supra note 6, at 1231.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1231-32.
103. Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L.
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like the U.S. district courts are handled, by applying the law to relevant
facts, interpreting the law where there is a dispute as to the meaning or
application of the law, or10 choosing
the appropriate rule where two rules
4
of law appear to conflict.
Article 13 grants each panel the right to ask for information from
each party, or anyone, including experts, that it feels is necessary to aid
in the understanding of the issues in the case. 10 5 Once all of the
information and briefs are submitted from the parties and from those who
were requested to supply information, the panel meets confidentially and
10 6
drafts a report to which each panelist contributes anonymously.
Following the submission of the report to each party, a time period is set
by the panel that allows each party to review and comment in writing on
the panel's initial ruling.'0 7 Further hearings will take place if it is
determined by the panel, from the comments submitted by the parties,
that more information needs to be presented. 10 8 If neither party responds
with any comments, the initial report shall be considered the final
report. 10 9 This final report will then be submitted to the entire
membership of the WTO. 110 The losing party has sixty days under
Article 16 to submit an appeal."' Also, upon consensus,
members of the
1 12
WTO can choose not to adopt the ruling by the panel.
3.

The Appellate Body

Like the Dispute Resolution Panels, the Appellate Body consists of
members who are chosen by the DSB. 1 3 Unlike the Dispute Resolution
Panels, however, the Appellate Body consists of seven members who are
"private citizens, not affiliated with any government."' 1 4 These private
citizens are legal scholars who have "demonstrated expertise in law,
international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements
generally." 15 Also, unlike the members of the Dispute Resolution Panel,
who are chosen on a case-by-case basis, the seven members of the
Appellate Body serve four-year terms, with the possibility of being
L.J. 333, 336 (1999).
104. Id. at 337.
105. DSU, supra note 6, at 1234.
106. Id. at 1235.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 74, at 436.
111. DSU, supra note 6, at 1235.
112. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 74, at 436.
113. DSU, supra note 6, at 1236.
114. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 74, at 436.
115. DSU, supra note 6, at 1236.
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reappointed to their position only once." 6 This manner of selecting the
members of the Appellate Body provides "consistency and coherence" to
the dispute resolution process in much the same way1 7as the appointment
of the U.S. Supreme Court justices does in America.'
Once an appeal is submitted to the Appellate Body, the case is
generally required to last no more than sixty days, and the appeal is
limited to the facts and issues of law outlined in the panel report. 8
Unlike its counterparts in the U.S. legal system, the Appellate Body is
not allowed to remand cases back to the panels.' 19 In addition, should a
panel decide that no applicable WTO rule of law exists to determine the
outcome of a case, the Appellate Body could agree with the panel, and
provide no remedy to the complaining party. 120 The remaining Appellate
Body procedures are similar to the procedures of the dispute resolution
panels. 12' The Appellate Body can also seek information from outside
sources under Article 13, the proceedings remain confidential,1 22and the
findings of the Appellate Body members are done unanimously.
4.

Other Arbitration Proceedings

The DSU also allows the dispute to be held before other means of
settlement, such as "mediation, conciliation or 'good offices."",123 This
means of dispute settlement is purely voluntary however, and should
party may still take its case
either party change its mind, the complaining
24
before a Dispute Settlement Panel.
5.

Remedy

As has been previously mentioned, countries that lost under the old
GATT system were required to pay the winning side only if they felt it
was in their best interest to do so, since the GATT panels' decisions were
non-binding. 125 Under the WTO, however, panel and Appellate Body
decisions are automatically binding and126the winning party can retaliate if
the losing party decides not to comply.
116. Id.
117. Paul B. Stephan, Sheriff or Prisoner? The U.S. and the World Trade
Organization, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 49, 52 (2000).
118. DSU, supra note 6, at 1236.
119. Trachtman, supra note 103, at 337.
120. Id. at 338.
121. See DSU, supra note 6, at 1236-37.
122. DSU, supra note 6, at 1236.
123. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 74, at 435.
124. Id.
125. See Laidhold, supra note 75, at 430-3 1.
126. DSU, supra note 6, at 1239.
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If the losing party fails to establish its own timeline, or if the parties
have failed to agree to a reasonable amount of time, the DSB is given the
task of assigning a reasonable amount of time in which the losing party is
given a chance to comply with the final ruling.127 If the losing party still
has not complied with the final ruling, it will be given an additional
twenty days in which to negotiate a compensation deal with the winning
party. 128 Should this negotiation round fail to achieve results,129the
winning party can take retaliatory measures against the losing party.
Typically, the retaliation will consist of trade restrictions on goods
of a similar nature as those involved in the complaint. 130 However, under
the same article, if it is "not practicable" to retaliate using trade
restrictions on goods of a similar nature, the winning party can employ
"cross retaliation"-meaning, specifically, that trade restrictions can be
imposed on non-related goods. 13 1 Despite this new form of enforcement,
some scholars believe that whether or not losing parties comply will
depend on the "goodwill" of the parties. 132 It is argued, rather
persuasively, that those countries that can afford to disobey the orders of
the WTO will continue to do so at the expense of the economically
challenged countries or those countries that are simply not large enough
133
to fight back.
IV. Acceptance of the Amicus Curiae Brief by the WTO
With the rapid growth and experience of NGOs on the international
stage, it was inevitable that the influence of NGOs would creep on to the
stage of the WTO dispute resolution process. 34 Lobbying in areas of
international human rights, environmental protection, etc., NGOs such as
Green Peace and Amnesty International are having a major influence on
the outcome of cases in international courts, as well as in international
policy. 35 Their influence on the WTO, however, has been slow due to
the belief of WTO members that its dispute resolution process should be
limited to governmental representatives from signature member
parties. 136
127. Jd. at 1238.
128. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 74, at 437.
129. DSU, supra note 6, at 1239.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Khansari, supra note 79, at 196.
133. Id.
134. See generally, Karsten Nowrot, Symposium: The Rule of Law in the Era of
Globalization: Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-Governmental
OrganizationsUnder InternationalLaw, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 579 (1999).
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Submissions of amici curiae by outside groups did not begin just
with NGOs, but with non-member countries and law firms as well. 137 As
interest in international law began to rise among NGOs the first amicus
curiae was submitted in a dispute 33 between the United States and
Brazil.' 39 The brief was dismissed and returned to the submitting party
140
with instructions to submit its brief to its representative government.
This summary dismissal did not deter the NGOs, and as the submissions
of amici curiae began to grow, so did the outcry by WTO member
governments. 41 Part of the outcry stems from the belief of WTO
members, that if NGOs are permitted to submit amici to the dispute
resolution process, NGOs and thus, non-members, would be afforded
greater access than members would be given. 142 Specifically, WTO
members can only be heard in a dispute if they are a primary or third
party. 143 For example, countries like India believe that it would be
somewhat humiliating to classify WTO members as something less than
a member just to partake in the privilege of submitting amici to a
dispute. 44 More moderate members, such as Canada, view the idea of
opening the formerly closed off system of the WTO as beneficial;
however, Canada believes that the decision to allow interference in the
dispute settlement system by non-governmental members should be
made by the WTO members themselves, and not by the panels or
Appellate Body. 45 The European Union echoed the sentiments of
Canada and asked only that the Appellate Body provide guidance
concerning when submission of amici by NGOs would be considered by
the court to be "pertinent."'' 46 Only New Zealand and Switzerland have
joined the United States in defending the Appellate Body's decision to
allow submissions of amici by outside parties. 147 The U.S. believed that
acceptance of amici from NGOs was unavoidable when considering the
Dispute Briefs, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORTER, Aug. 17, 2000, at 1283 [hereinafter

Dispute Briefs].
137. Id.
138. The dispute concerned the strict standards placed on gasoline emissions of
foreign countries doing business in the U.S. The WTO eventually ruled that the
standards were too restrictive and discriminated against foreign supplies in favor of
domestic supplies. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Daniel Pruzin, WTO Appellate Body Under Fire for Move to Accept Amicus
Curiae Briefs From NGOs, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORTER, Nov. 30, 2000, at 1805
[hereinafter Briefs from NGOs].
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1806.
146. Pruzin, supra note 4, at 924.
147. Briefs from NGOs, supra note 142, at 1805.
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growing number of amici being filed in cases before the dispute
resolution system of the WTO. 148 In an effort to facilitate this procedure,
the U.S. believes that the submission of amicus curiae briefs by NGO's
should be formalized to allow for a more uniform and judicial means of
149
submission.

Whatever that formalization of process may be, it is currently clear
that no specific language in the DSU allows for the submission of amici
from NGOs. 150 So, how then does the Appellate Body justify its
acceptance of such briefs? This article will examine this issue by
considering two recent and controversial cases, namely The ShrimpTurtle Decision1 51 and The British Steele Case.152 In the Shrimp-Turtle
Decision, the U.S., a WTO member, actually submitted the briefs for the
NGOs. 153 However, more controversy was created in the British Steele
Case when the Appellate Body, though declaring submission of amici by
NGOs to be improper, insisted that it had the authority to "accept and
consider amicus curiae briefs in an appeal in which we find it pertinent
'
and useful to do SO. 154
A.

Submission and Controversy by Non-Member, Non-Governmental
Organizations: The Shrimp-Turtle Decision

United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products (Shrimp-Turtle) originated in a claim brought by the WTO
member countries of India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Thailand. 55 In
accordance with the Endangered Species Act of 1973, the U.S. required
all shrimping vessels be fitted with Turtle Excluder Devices (TEDs) in
order to protect the endangered sea turtles that were being inadvertently
trapped and killed. 156 The sea turtles were becoming entangled in the
fishing nets and would drown when they were unable to surface for
air.1 57 Under the cover of multilateral trading rules the U.S. refused to
import shrimp from countries that failed to use TEDs to protect the

148. Id.
149. Rossella Brevetti, WTO Urged to Formalize Processfor NGO's Participationin
Disputes, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORTER, Nov. 16, 2000, at 1734.
150. See footnote 6.
151. Shrimp Turtle, supra note 7, at 1.
152. British Steele, supra note 8, at 1.
153. Pruzin, supra note 4, at 924.
154. Id.
155. Shrimp Turtle, supra note 7, at 1.
156. U.S. - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/RW, 3, 15 June 2001.
157. Environment: WTO Appeals Body Faults Implementation of Shrimp-Turtle Law,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORTER, Oct. 14, 1998, at 1698 [hereinafter Environment].
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endangered sea turtles.15 8 The U.S. granted automatic immunity to the
import ban to countries that did not have the specific species of turtles in
their waters where shrimping was taking place, to countries that
employed non-hazardous means of shrimp gathering which did not harm
the sea turtles, and to any country which had no sea turtles whatsoever in
their coastal waters.' 59 Other nations could apply for an exemption to the
import ban by producing evidence of regulatory programs which
which were comparable to
implemented safety measures in shrimping
160
those outlined and used by the U.S.
Upset with the U.S. for unilaterally mandating its own laws on other
WTO members, the countries of India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Thailand
filed a grievance with the Dispute Resolution Body on the grounds that
the U.S. policy banning importation of shrimp from countries not
implementing the TEDs was discriminatory. 161 Brought before a Dispute
Resolution Panel, the case centered on the import ban, specifically
Section 609, which the four Asian countries claimed was a direct
violation of Article 11 of the GATT. 162 This article restricts the
measures member countries can take with regard to unilaterally banning
trade with other WTO member countries. 163 The Panel agreed, holding
that section 609 provided "unjustifiable discrimination" against the four
Asian countries.' 64 The section was unjustifiable because it allowed
shrimp imports automatically from some countries, while forcing others
to apply for exemption. 165 In its defense, the U.S. argued that the ban on
some countries was justifiable and necessary. 166 The ban was justifiable,
argued the U.S., because the sea turtles were an endangered species
worldwide, and were in danger of becoming extinct unless the use of
TEDs was implemented in every country where shrimping endangered
the sea turtles. 167 Therefore, in order to prevent the extinction of the sea
turtles, a distinction was made, and those countries that implemented
protection measures were rewarded, while those that did not were
While lauding the
prohibited from importing their shrimp. 168
environmental efforts of the U.S., the panel ultimately rejected the
argument, and held that the use of the import ban by the U.S. was a
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 7, at 2.
Id.
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169
"threat to the multilateral trading system."'
The U.S. created further controversy by submitting three amicus
curiae briefs prepared by non-governmental organizations. 70
As
previously mentioned, Article 13 of the DSU does not specifically permit
17 1
the submission of amici from non-member, non-governmental groups.
In support of the submissions of the amici, the U.S. argued that while
Article 13 permitted a panel or appellate body to accept submissions by
any source it so chose, it does not specifically deny the submission of
those amici merely because they were unsolicited. 172 The U.S. argued
that denying the submission of the briefs by NGOs would limit the
options for information that the DSU grants to the panels and Appellate
Body. 173 The four Asian countries, however, protested the use of the
amici as being strictly prohibited by Article 13.174 The control of outside
information, they argued, was specifically granted to panel and Appellate
Body members, and that only these members have discretion in seeking
information applicable to each case. 175 Unfortunately for the U.S., the
panel agreed with the four Asian countries 176
and ignored the submissions
of the NGOs in making their final decision.
In accordance with Article 16 of the DSU, the United States
appealed the panel decision to the Appellate Body of the WTO. 17 7 In its
brief, the U.S. claimed that the Dispute Panel erred in determining that
section 609 was unjustified and discriminatory.178 Similarly, the U.S.
claimed that the panel erred in denying the submission of the amici by
the NGOs. 179 Unsurprisingly, the four Asian countries asked that the
ruling of the Dispute Panels be upheld, and that the U.S. not be permitted
to unilaterally impose trade sanctions against other WTO member
countries when it has specifically agreed under the WTO to maintain a
multilateral process in trade negotiations and solutions. 180 With regard to
the submission of amici from NGOs, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and
81
Thailand continued to assert that the submissions were not allowed.1
Specifically, the four Asian countries pointed out the fact that when
seeking additional information, the panels and Appellate Body were

169.

Id.

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Environment, supra note 157, at 1698.
See DSU,supra note 6,at 1234.
Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 7,at 4.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 7,at 4.
Id.
Id.at ll.
Id.at9.

FRIEND OF THE COURT

2004]

required under the DSU to notify the contending members that such
information was being sought. 82 In addition, they also argued that since
WTO members who are not part of the original dispute are denied the
chance to participate by submitting amici, it would be unreasonable for
the panels or the Appellate Body to accept amici from non-member, nongovernmental groups. 183 One very rational argument advanced by the
four Asian countries was that if amici from NGOs were allowed, the
possibility of an onslaught of amici in a given case could, in fact, cause
undue burden on opposing parties, as well as the panels and Appellate
Body. 184 The opposing party may feel that it has to respond to each
amicus submission on the off chance that one of the panelists or
Body would give credence to the argument
members of the Appellate
85
contained therein.
Several other countries, as third party participants, also weighed in
on the issue of whether or not unsolicited amici could be submitted by
NGOs. 186 Australia, disagreeing with the United States' argument on
both issues maintained that the DSU does not afford NGOs an
opportunity to provide unsolicited information, and that if the Panel had
wanted the information provided by the amici, it could have requested
it. 187 The European Community also voiced its disfavor in allowing
NGOs to submit unsolicited amici, especially when each NGO has the
right to publish its views in journals and other periodicals, which could
then be viewed by the general public, as well as both parties to the
dispute, the panelists, and members of the Appellate Body.1 88 Sensing
that an opportunity to be heard may be lost, many environmental groups
backed the 189
original NGO amici submissions, which also weighed in on
appeal.
the
In its decision in October of 1998, the Appellate Body first
addressed the issue of whether or not non-member, non-governmental
groups could submit amici to either the Dispute Resolution Panels or the
Appellate Body.' 90 The Appellate Body began its analysis by putting
forth the question to the United States, as to what extent it adopted the
information contained in the amici submitted by the NGOs. 19' The U.S.
responded by stating that its views pertaining to the case were contained
182.
183.
184.
185.
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191.
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in the briefs submitted by the U.S. to the Panel and Appellate Body, and
that while it considered the views expressed by the NGOs to be separate
from its own, the expert opinions and information should not be
overlooked by the Panel or the Appellate Body. 192 In considering this
response from the U.S., and a dissimilar response from the four Asian
countries, the Appellate Body decided that the issue of the admissibility
of the amici by the NGOs was a separate legal issue, which it felt that the
Panel did not specifically address in its report.193 In a holding which
created outcry and controversy, the Appellate Body found that the
attaching of amici to the material submitted by either the appellant or the
appellee, regardless of where that material may have originated, "renders
that material at least prima facie an integral part of that participant's
submission."' 194 Much to the chagrin of the four Asian countries and the
third parties to the dispute, the Appellate court accepted the submission
of the attached amici by the United States.'95 However, due to the
admission by the U.S. that it only adopted those views that were
consistent with its own argument, the Appellate Body focused primarily
on those arguments advanced by the original brief submitted by the
U.S. 196

So, how did the Appellate Body arrive at this conclusion you may
ask? First, the Appellate Body retraced the steps already set forth in this
article and arrived at Article 13 of the DSU. 19 7 At the explanation of the
Appellate Body, Article 13 grants each panel the right to seek any
additional information and/or expert advice from any source that it feels
is applicable to the case.' 98 Therefore, according to the Appellate Body,.
Article 13 grants each panel the authority to seek information, as well as
the authority to seek no information at all. 199 This authority, should also
be viewed in light of Article 12 of the DSU, which authorizes the panel
to "depart from, or to add to," or in other words, create their own
"Working Procedures," which may aid in providing reports that are
efficient and high quality. 200 This authority, granted to the panels by the
DSB, does not seek to limit the information available to the panels in
deciding a dispute; on the contrary, it grants the panel the authority to
accept or reject any information that is submitted, even without being
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requested. 20 1 Even so, the Appellate Body urged that the panelists did
not reject the NGO amici outright in this case, they merely suggested that
if the parties wished the amici to be included, that each party include
them in their own briefs to the panel.20 2 Therefore, the Appellate Body
found that the panel erred in concluding that the DSU does not provide
for the acceptance of amicus curiae from NGOs, and that the panel was
acting within its authority when it accepted the briefs of the appellants
that contained the NGO amicus curiae submissions.20 3 Unfortunately for
the U.S., the Appellate Body rejected its argument that the panel erred in
holding that the trade restrictions pursuant to section 609 were
unjustifiably discriminating. 204 As with the panel report, the Appellate
Body lauded efforts made by the United States to protect the
environment, specifically the endangered sea turtles.20 5 However, it
concluded that the United States cannot unilaterally impose trade
restrictions on non-complying WTO member countries and suggested
that multilateral discussions be entered into to address the protection of
the sea turtles.20 6
As one commentator has pointed out, along with a few hints from
the Appellate Body, the outcome of this case may have been decided
differently had the United States sought multilateral support for its sea
turtle protection measures. 207
According to the Appellate Body,
environmental issues are exactly the kind of issue that merits
multilateral, as opposed to unilateral, measures.20 8 The crux of this
dictum is that, for the first time, it appeared that the WTO was willing to
entertain issues regarding environmental matters, and while upset with
the overall decision, the U.S. was pleased that the environment may soon
become a matter of interest to the WTO.2 °9 Clearly, while environmental
groups took this decision a lot harder than the United States government,
the door was opened for the environmental NGOs to further their cause
210
in the WTO through lobbying with the aid of the amicus curiae.
This decision also upset many WTO member countries that were
opposed to allowing non-member groups access to the exclusive trade

201. Id.
202. Id. at 30.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 53.
205. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 7, at 55.
206. Id.
207. Ryan L. Winter, Note, Reconciling the GA 7T and WTO with Multilateral
Environmental Agreements: Can We Have Our Cake and Eat it Too? 11 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 223,242 (2000).
208. Id.
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organization. 21' Arguing that the decision had given NGOs greater rights
than WTO members, countries such as Pakistan lobbied for an
amendment to the DSU that would overturn the Appellate Body decision
in Shrimp-Turtle.21 2 Other countries insisted that the business of the
WTO dealt with matters relating specifically between governments, and
the voice granted to NGOs, although limited, would undermine the
"objective and legal examination of the issues. '' 213 Still others are
concerned in the lobbying shift from traditional NGOs to law firms and
corporations who are financially and academically superior to their
counterparts in third world countries.21 4 As these fears and objections
began to simmer following the Shrimp-Turtle decision, the Appellate
Body added more fuel to the fire through its holding in the British Steel
decision.2 15
B.

Submission and Controversy by Non-Member, Non-Governmental
Organizations: The British Steel Case

The fears by developing nations that the NGO lobbyist was
becoming more corporate was soon realized in May of 2000, when the
Appellate Body accepted amicus curiae briefs from the industrial
American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) on behalf of the United States in
The British Steel Case.216 Originally, the AISI filed the amicus in the
panel proceedings, but was rejected by the panel for being untimely. 1 7
Not to be shutout, the AISI, along with the Specialty Steel Industry of
North America (SSINA), resubmitted its amicus brief when the U.S.
appealed to the Appellate Body.21 8 The major difference between this
case and Shrimp-Turtle was the fact that the AISI and the SSINA
to the Appellate Body instead of including
submitted their amici21directly
9
it with the U.S. brief.

The dispute began when the United States Department of
Commerce applied countervailing duties on imports of leaded bars
acquired by United Engineering Steels Limited (UES), a British joint
venture, to British Steel Engineering Steels (BSES). 220

BSES was

211. Charnovitz, supra note 79, at 185.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Andrea Kupfer Schneider, InstitutionalConcerns of an Expanded Trade Regime:
Where Should Global Social and Regulatory Policy Be Made?: Unfriendly Actions: The
Amicus BriefBattle at the WTO, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 87, 100 (2001).
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created through the privatization of the UES joint venture by the British
government. 22' As was mentioned above, the Dispute Resolution Panel
rejected the amici submitted on behalf of the United States by ASIS and
SSINA.222 Following the notice given to the DSB by the United States of
its intent to appeal the panel decision, the NGOs resubmitted their amici
directly to the Appellate Body.223 Over the objection of the European
Communities (EC) as well as other third parties to the dispute, the
Appellate Body accepted the amici briefs.224 Similar to its argument
made in Shrimp-Turtle, the EC claimed that Article 13 of the DSU did
not allow for the submission of unsolicited amicus curiae to the Dispute
Resolution Panel and Appellate Body Proceedings.22 5 Even if the
Appellate Body did find that Article 13 allowed the submission of amici
to Appellate Body Proceedings, the EC argued that Article 13
specifically limited that information to factual or technical advice, not
interpretations of law.2 26 The EC further argued that Article 17.4 and
17.10 confine any arguments made before the Appellate Body to those
made by members to the dispute and third parties, which arguments must
be kept confidential. 2 7
In February 2000, the Appellate Body submitted the arguments to
the United States, in addition to Brazil and Mexico, who were third
parties, for comment on the arguments advanced by the EC.228 Both
Mexico and Brazil agreed that the Appellate Body should distinguish the
amicus submissions between those containing issues of fact, and those
containing issues of law.229 Specifically, Brazil argued that the parties
alone were qualified to make legal arguments regarding the issues of law
implemented under the rules of the WTO.23 °
In its reply, the U.S. asked the court to remember its ruling in the
Shrimp-Turtle decision regarding a panel's authority to hear or deny
unsolicited amicus submissions.2 3' Specifically, the Appellate Body
determined that the "Working Procedures" outlined in the DSU granted
the panel the authority to control the means of submission of outside
information. 32 In contrast to the argument advanced by the EC, the U.S.
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argument claimed that the Appellate Body, under its own "Working
Procedures," which are outlined under Article 17 of the DSU, had the
same authority to "create an appropriate procedure when a question
arises that is not covered by the Working Procedures. 23 3 In a futile
attempt, the U.S. further argued that the acceptance of unsolicited briefs
the
by the Appellate Body would in no way "compromise"
234
confidentiality granted to the Appellate Body proceedings.
Accepting the argument put forth by the United States, the
Appellate Body held, once again, that it had the authority to accept the
submitted amicus curiae briefs. 235 The Appellate Body, in outlining its
holding, began with the acceptance of the fact that nothing in the DSU or
the "Working Procedures" specifically allowed it to accept the amici
submitted by the NGOs. 236 However, nothing in the DSU or the
"Working Procedures" specifically denied the Appellate Body's
authority to accept the amici either.237 Bolstering its argument with
quotes from its holding in Shrimp-Turtle, the Appellate Body reiterated
that only signature members of the WTO, who are parties or third parties
to the dispute, have a legal right to be heard and to participate in
proceedings before a panel or the Appellate Body.238 NGOs are not
signatory members, therefore, they have no legal right to be heard, and
neither a panel nor the Appellate Body is legally obliged to accept or
consider amici submitted by the NGOs. 239 That being said, however, a
panel or the Appellate Body does have the legal authority to consider the
amici whether or not the NGOs have a legal right to submit them.24 °
Since the Appellate Body had the legal right to consider the amici, and
the legal right not to consider them, the Appellate Body found the amicus
curiae briefs submitted in this case to be non-pertinent in making its final
decision, and did not use them.241
Unfortunately, the argument made by the Appellate Body in its
justification of its acceptance of amici from NGOs has fallen on deaf
ears, and WTO member governments continue to oppose their
submission and consideration.2 42 But why are the WTO member
governments who oppose the submission of the amici so determined to
keep NGOs out of the dispute settlement process? To answer that
233.
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question, a brief overview of non-governmental organization activity
would be pertinent.
V.

Non-Governmental Organizations: An Overview

The fear of NGOs may very well stem from the decline in global
influence of the nation-state. 243 On a global scale, NGOs frequently
pressure large corporations into complying with the NGOs'
private/global agenda.24 4 In one example, Greenpeace International
pressured Shell Oil Company not to scuttle an aging oilrig into the North
Atlantic Ocean by waging a campaign in Germany that resulted in a loss
for Shell of over thirty percent in gas revenue, due to the decline in
purchases. 245 NGOs often achieve success by persuading the consumer
to boycott products that are produced or marketed in opposition to the
economic and environmental goals of the NGOs. 246 The dolphin will
ever be grateful for the intervention of NGOs in persuading the
consumers of tuna fish to boycott those companies who did not take
protective measures to ensure that no dolphins were being trapped and
killed in their tuna nets.247 While few and far between, the victories won
by the NGOs have given them a powerful lobbying tool with
corporations and governments alike.248
But are these not the types of behaviors that we would like to see
enforced with corporations and governments? Are the NGOs not merely
looking out for the welfare of the planet and its citizens? Certainly
groups such as women, children, and the elderly are better protected
through the efforts of human rights and environmental groups, right? So
what have we to fear from the NGOs?
The fear of corporations is obvious: loss of profits. 249 But, instead
of waging war on the NGOs, corporations are responding proactively by
forming their own industry watchdog groups to police themselves.25 °
While the efforts of the non-governmental groups may appear laudable,
what the governments fear is this persuasive power that is yielded by the
NGOs beyond governmental territorial boundaries.25 1
While no
243. Peter J. Spiro, The Decline of the Nation State and its Effect on Constitutional
and International Economic Law: Contribution: New Global Potentates:
Nongovernmental Organizations and the "Unregulated" Marketplace, 18 CARDoZO L.
REv. 957 (1996).
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246. Id. at 959-960.
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248. Id.
249. Spiro, supra note 243, at 961.
250. Id. at 961-62.
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officially sanctioned laws are declared, if corporations and industries are
following these NGO persuasions worldwide, for fear of boycotting, the
policies advanced by the NGOs might as well be the law for all intents
and purposes.252 Additionally, governments fear NGOs for the same
reason NGOs fear the WTO: lack of transparency. 253 Like their rivals in
the WTO, the leadership positions in NGOs are typically filled by
appointment, and not by election; therefore, they have no constituents to
whom they are accountable. 54 While NGOs cry for more access to what
they see as an authoritative, closed-off WTO, the non-governmental
organizations need only be as open as they so choose. 5 Again, the
example involving Shell Oil is illustrative.256 While attempting to
pressure Shell Oil into not scuttling an outdated oilrig to the bottom of
the North Atlantic Ocean, Greenpeace received incorrect information
regarding the potential damage the scuttling would have on the North
verification, and an
Even after independent
Atlantic. 7
its information was
that
of
Greenpeace
on
behalf
acknowledgement
incorrect, it continued to pressure Shell into disposing of the rig using
other means, which was very costly to the company.25 8 In fact, to
prevent further loss of revenue, due to the boycotting against its interests
in Germany, Shell has gone so far at to ask Greenpeace for advice on
how it can scuttle other outdated rigs.2 59 With this kind of pressure, it is
doubtful if any corporation would dare scuttle their outdated rigs for fear
of retribution from Greenpeace or other NGOs.2 6 °
Whether one despises or hails non-governmental organizations,
these groups have been around since the nineteenth century and it does
261
not appear that they will become less influential anytime soon.
Recognizing this fact, the United Nations, almost since its inception, has
provided for ways of accepting and dealing with information submitted
The non-governmental
by non-governmental organizations. 262
organizations are generally defined by the United Nations to be any
international organizations that have not been created by governmental
or inter-governmental organizations.26 3 Whatever their definition may
252. Id. at 962.
253. William M. Reichert, Resolving the Trade and Environment Conflict: The WTO
and NGO ConsultativeRelations, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 219, 225 (1996).
254. Spiro, supra note 243, at 963.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 964.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 965.
260. Spiro, supra note 243, at 965.
261. Reichert, supra note 253, at 227.
262. Id. at 228-29.
263. Id. at 227.
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be, however, NGOs are not allowed to directly address the General
Assembly, which is the main governmental representative body of the
United Nations.26 Indeed, the role of the NGO in the United Nations,
while receiving greater recognition than that received from the WTO, is
still relegated to that of a provider of information rather than a direct
member of the organization. 265 A non-governmental organization may
only submit information to the Economic and Social committee of the
United Nations, which was set up specifically for this purpose.26 6 The
original hope of the United Nations was that NGOs would bring the
voice of the world community and would act as a link to the public at
large. 267 However, due to the large number of non-governmental
organizations in existence, this information typically tends to clog up the
system and make it difficult for any of their concerns to be heard.268
Ironically, despite the usual fears expressed by governmental
members of the WTO, many governmental organizations rely on NGOs
to act where they normally cannot. 269 For example, the International
Atomic Energy Agency often uses NGOs to monitor the nuclear activity
of countries like Iraq. 270 The assistance of NGOs is beneficial because
they are not required to obtain permission to enter the country and
because they do not need to make sure that their speech is politically
correct, as they are not acting in the role of a governmental agency, even
though they may be acting on behalf of them.27 1
Up until the Uruguay Round negotiations began in 1986, the only
non-governmental organization to submit information to the WTO
predecessor, the GATT, was the International Chamber of Commerce. 272
The GATT signatory governments made no protests, and no other NGOs
sought to be included.273 As the trade negotiations began to intensify
during the Uruguay Round, which ultimately led to the creation of the
WTO, many NGOs became interested in the trade process, and became
outraged when their concerns were not addressed by the governmental
organizations who were negotiating the rules for the new World Trade
Organization.274
264. Id. at 230.
265. Id.
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Eventually, due to pressure from the NGOs, and some governments,
including the United States, the WTO began discussions on ways to be
more open to non-governmental organizations.275 The new provisions
instructed the WTO Secretariat to be more actively engaged in its
contacts with NGOs.276 While NGOs were still not allowed to participate
directly in the workings of the organization, WTO committee
chairpersons could individually meet with NGOs to discuss any issues
that the NGOs wished to have addressed.2 77 Progress on the openness of
the WTO committees continued to expand the role in the decision
making process to the NGOs.278 In 1997, the WTO, along with the
United Nations, sponsored a symposium to discuss the importance of the
role of NGOs in the international trade arena. 279 And while progress
continues to be made, it is apparent, from the disturbance made by
protestors at the WTO conference held in Seattle in 1999, that the WTO
has a long way to go to please these outside interests. 280 Most notably,
the judicial and dispute resolution process of the WTO is still relatively
closed to NGO participation, although, as has been explained above, this
process is beginning to be enlarged.2 81
Following the British Steel case, the Appellate Body inadvertently
opened the door for more judicial lobbying from NGOs.2 82 In E.C.Asbestos, the Appellate Body turned once again to its "Working
Procedures" to develop a procedure for NGOs to submit amicus curiae to
the Appellate Body.283 The new procedure required for anyone wishing
to submit information to first apply for and receive leave from the
Appellate Body.2 84 The Appellate Body attempted to make clear that
these new procedures applied only to E.C.-Asbestos, and would not
apply to any future proceeding.2 85 Up to seventeen NGOs and one
individual applied for leave from the Appellate Body in order to submit
amici in E.C.-Asbestos, and in a shocking move, the Appellate Body
rejected every submission with no explanation.2 86 Despite the rejection
by the Appellate Body, the new "Working Procedures" surprised and
outraged many governments, who responded with a political attack on
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the Appellate Body.28 7 Likewise, NGOs did not sit idly following the
summary dismissal of their amici.28 s Several large environmental NGOs,
including Greenpeace, expressed their overwhelming disappointment in
the Appellate Body, not only for the rejection of their amici, but also for
289
It has been argued that the Appellate
doing so without explanation.
Body rejected the submission of the briefs following pressure from
governmental groups, for acting inappropriately in the role of legislator,
by adopting and implementing the procedure for submission of the
amici. 29° The goal of the Appellate Body, to manage the submission of
amici by NGOs, was admirable. However, it failed to follow its role as
the judicial arm of the WTO as opposed to its legislative arm.291
Whatever the reason may have been for the rejection of the amici, the
Appellate Body, in its E.C.-Asbestos decision in March of 2001, merely
explained that it dismissed the submissions for their failure to comply
with the guidelines it set forth.292
Whatever the reasons for rejection or acceptance, it is apparent from
the material above that NGOs will continue to demand a voice on the
stage of the world trade process. But do they deserve that voice? It is
clear that the NGOs desire to be a voice for the people, but do the people
need the unelected NGOs to speak out for them? 293 It is this question
that is promulgated by the governmental members of the WTO,
specifically that the decisions made by the WTO member governments
do not directly affect the people.294 The WTO, they argue, is about trade
issues between governments, who are either elected representatives of
the people, or are representative due to their status as the people's
29
sovereign. 29 The NGOs they claim, would only serve to muddy the
waters of an already politically difficult world trade process.296
Now that we have heard some of the arguments advanced by the
WTO member governments regarding why NGOs should be excluded
from the WTO process, it is only fair that the NGO argument, regarding
why they should be included in the WTO process, should also be heard.
To begin, governmental agencies do not have a monopoly on ideas, and
allowing NGOs a voice in the WTO process would allow for the
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submission of more information at the cost of the NGOs rather than the
prospective governments. 297 NGOs could also aid in enforcement of
WTO trade regulations through the boycotting measures discussed
above.298 If Government A is failing to comply with WTO regulations at
the detriment of Government B, then the NGOs could assist by
advancing boycotting measures to the public to enforce Government A's
compliance. 299 However, it is this kind of non-boundary intervention that
the governments oppose and fear. 300 As a sovereign, Government A
could react to any implementations made against it by the sovereign of
Government B; however, it cannot take measures against an international
non-governmental group which has no boundaries to contain it.3' Most
recently, in early 2001, several WTO member governments lashed out at
NGOs and the Appellate Body, and argued that the participation of
NGOs in the dispute resolution process was leading to a breach in the
DSU rule requiring confidentiality in dispute settlement proceedings.30 2
Specifically, Thailand charged that paragraphs in the brief it submitted to
the Appellate Body appeared in a brief submitted by a non-governmental
organization, which due to the dispute settlement policy was forwarded
to both Thailand and its opponent, Poland, which gave an advantage to
Poland.30 3
Mexico and the Philippines joined Thailand in its
3
0
4
complaint.
Only the United States argued that there was no link
between the loss of confidentiality and the amicus submissions of
NGOs.3 °5
Whatever the fears of the WTO member governments, it is obvious
from the examples stated above that NGOs are a great asset on behalf of
environmental and human rights interests around the world. From the
viewpoint of the endangered sea turtle and the dolphin, NGOs are a
much-needed commodity in the arena of international trade.30 6 Among
other causes, NGOs fight for the health of world citizens through their
campaign for the removal of asbestos from building materials used
around the globe.30 7
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VI. Recommendations
It is apparent from the evidence outlined above that the battle
between the WTO member governments and NGOs are not going away
anytime soon. So, what alternatives exist to facilitate a more compatible
relationship between the two necessary opponents? Ideally, the two
sides would simply agree to agree. Other International Courts have
recognized the right of individuals and non-governmental organizations
to file briefs in their own behalf or on behalf of others. 30 8 Specifically,
the African Court of Human and People's Rights instituted protocols
defining how individuals and NGOs may submit cases or briefs directly
to the court. 3 09 As outlined above, the WTO dispute resolution process,
other than the recent holdings of the Appellate Body, has no such
protocols in place. 310 Rather than complain and scream at the Appellate
Body for accepting amicus filings by NGOs, the WTO governmental
members should work together with the NGOs, the dispute resolution
panels, and the Appellate Body to create acceptable, workable guidelines
that would protect the interests on all sides. Recognizing its leadership
position in the arena of international trade, U.S. House of
Representatives members Rangel and Levin proposed legislation calling
for an expanded effort to convince the WTO to open its doors to nonThe legislation advances a greater
governmental organizations. 3 1
transparency in the WTO by allowing NGOs to participate in trade
negotiations, and advocating new procedures that would allow and direct
the submission of amicus filings to the dispute resolution panels and the
Appellate Body.312
Alternatively, while direct participation in the WTO would be
preferable to the NGOs, their lobbying power with the governments and
corporations of the world still allows them to have a powerful influence
in the international trade arena. While they may not have a direct voice
in the negotiation of trade policy, NGOs can continue to advance their
own policies prior to and during negotiations directly to the governments
involved. The governments are not legally required to listen. However,
it has been shown in this article that it is in the best interests of those
308. Abdelsalam A. Mohamed, Individual and NGO Participationin Human Rights
Litigation Before the African Court of Human and People s Rights: Lessons Learned
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involved to give ear to what NGOs have to say.
Many observers of the WTO strongly agree that a greater voice
needs to be given to NGOs in the realm of international trade.3" 3
Arguing that the increased transparency in the WTO would lead to an
improvement in public confidence in the WTO, the observers suggest
that the WTO Secretariat create a "toolkit" for the NGOs to aid them in
properly submitting amicus curiae to the dispute resolution panels and
the Appellate Body.3 14
VII. Conclusion
It has been apparent from the cases discussed in this article that the
Appellate Body has decided that it, along with the dispute resolution
panels, has the authority under the "Working Procedures" of the DSU to
request and accept amicus curiae briefs from non-governmental
organizations. While the DSU does not specifically allow for the
acceptance of unsolicited amici curiae, it does not specifically prevent
them either.3 15 In light of this view, and in light of the fact that the
NGOs are not going away anytime soon, it would behoove the
governmental members of the WTO to quickly address and draft
procedures and policies for the submission of amici by nongovernmental organizations. Through this process the fears of the
member governments can be addressed and legislated. Should an NGO
be found in violation of policies regarding confidentiality, the WTO
could be given the authority to ban further participation in WTO
proceedings by that NGO. Similarly, it is possible to ensure that no
greater burden would be placed on the dispute resolution panels, the
Appellate Body, or the parties to the dispute themselves despite the
growing number of NGO amicus filings. For instance, a provision can
be included that allows everyone involved to disregard arguments made
by non-governmental organizations whose briefs are not applicable to a
given grievance.
Whatever the solution may eventually provide, it is doubtful that the
debate on the role of non-governmental organizations in the WTO will
end in the near future. 3 16 Governments will continue to fear attacks on
their sovereignty from NGOs, and NGOs will continue to shout, fight
and boycott for the advancement of their own international policies.
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